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Socially Rational Business 
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What is the goal of social enterprise policy?  Is it the creation of a ‘not-for-profit’ or 
‘more-than-profit’ business movement?  In institutional policy circles, arguments are shaped 
by the desire to protect assets for the community, while entrepreneurial discourses favour a 
mixture of investment sources, surplus sharing and inclusive systems of governance.  This 
article uses data from a critical ethnography to offer a third perspective.  Human behaviour is 
a product of, and support system for, our socio-sexual choices.  A grounded theory of social 
and economic capital is developed that integrates sexuality into organisation development.  
This constructs business organisations as complex centres of community-building replete 
with economic and social goals.  By viewing corporate governance from this perspective 
social enterprise is reconceived as a business movement guided by social rationality with the 
long-term goal of distributing social and economic capital across stakeholder groups to 
satisfy individual and collective needs. 
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1. Introduction 
Different philosophical commitments induce a variety of approaches to ownership and control 
in social enterprises (Brown, 2006; Ridley-Duff, 2007).  Entrepreneurial and government 
arguments differ over whether the goal of social enterprise policy is the creation of a ‘not-for-
profit’ or ‘more-than-profit’ business movement (Haugh, 2005; Allen, 2005).  In institutional 
policy circles, arguments are shaped by the desire to protect assets for community use (DTI, 
2002, 2003; Pearce, 2003), while entrepreneurial discourses favour a mixture of investment 
sources, surplus sharing and inclusive systems of governance (Ridley-Duff, 2002; Harding 
and Cowling, 2004; Wallace, 2005; Brown, 2006).   
This article argues that focussing on ‘profit’ arguments obscures underlying similarities and 
differences in organization across economic sectors.  By critiquing Etzioni’s normative-
affective decision-making model (Etzioni, 1988), and drawing on a variety of studies (Collins 
and Porras, 2000; Collins, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2005), further theoretical elaboration on the 
reasons for social enterprise diversity – as well as its locus - is developed by unravelling 
contradictions in the various definitions of social enterprise.  The concept of social rationality 
is used to offer new perspective that accommodates the diversity found in the sector as well 
the role of the workplace in building the broader community. 
In section 2, ‘not-for-profit’ and ‘more-than-profit’ discourses are discussed to reveal their 
underlying contradictions.  In section 3, I briefly describe the methodology used.  Theory is 
developed and presented in section 4 to extend understanding of social capital development.  
In section 5, these concepts are brought together in a framework that reflects the 
heterogeneity of social objectives that drive enterprise development.  In section 6, I discuss 
the implications for practice and future research. 
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2. Discourses in Social Enterprise 
In Pearce (2003:32-33), the various shades of social enterprise definition are elaborated at 
length.  While there is near unanimity regarding the primacy of ‘social objectives’, different 
individuals and agencies elaborate a variety of ways to achieve them:  
…[in social enterprises] all assets and accumulated wealth are not in the ownership of 
individuals….1 
…[social enterprises are] independent…and provide services, goods and trade for a social 
purpose and are non-profit distributing…2 
…[in social enterprises] profits are used to create more jobs and businesses and to generate 
wealth for the benefit of the community…3 
These words articulate the so-called ‘not-for-profit’ discourse on social enterprise.  On close 
examination, however, it becomes clear there is no ideological objection to the idea that 
assets and capital can be accumulated.  It is apparent in the first quotation that collective 
rather than individual assets are preferred.  In the second and third quotes, however, 
contradictions become apparent.  One view is that profits should not be distributed; the other 
views profit distribution as the purpose of social enterprise.  Haugh (2005:3), therefore, 
clarifies who is barred from receiving profits when she argues that “social enterprises are 
prevented from distributing their profits to those who exercise control over them.”   
All these definitions share a tacit assumption that the purpose of a ‘not-for-profit’ orientation 
is to encourage high levels of reinvestment in economic activity.  It is this aspect that has 
been widely promoted in the DTI’s own definition of social enterprise as “a business with 
primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose” (DTI, 
2002, cited in Pearce, 2003:32).  While the DTI strategy, and Community Interest Company 
(CIC) legislation, does not directly ban distribution of surpluses to individuals (by allowing, for 
example, staff bonuses and employee share schemes), ‘not-for-profit’ rhetoric pervades both 
policy documents and academic debate (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). 
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Problems with the Not-for-Profit View  
Profit-making per se, however, is not the issue.  Indeed, in all the above quotations, there is 
an implicit assumption that profits are desirable so long as they can be channelled towards 
the collective needs of socially excluded groups, rather than already wealthy individuals.  
This view of social enterprise, therefore, is redistributive with strong ideological commitments 
against individual appropriation of wealth.  Such communitarian sentiments place emphasis 
on collective over individual good to develop arguments for greater civic and social 
responsibility (see Etzioni, 1995, 1998; Collins, 1997; Tam, 1999; Lutz, 2000).   
Critics, however, draw attention to two problems.  Firstly, hierarchies and oligarchies may 
rapidly develop that allow elites to control resources regardless of the precise ownership and 
control mechanisms established (Michels, 1961; Vanek, 1977; Cornforth et al, 1988; Kasmir, 
1996).  Secondly, emphasising collective over individual rights often becomes oppressive to 
individuals (and out of favour groups) by legitimating ‘collective’ solutions that are 
expressions of managerial interests (see Willmott, 1993; Griseri, 1998; Starrat, 2001; Parker, 
2002; Johnson, 2006). 
On the question of surplus distribution, many have argued that non-profit orientations, and 
particularly asset-locks, create long-term investment problems.  Working for wages denies 
capital gains to the very people creating them and demotivates stakeholders through ‘equity 
devaluation’ (Major and Boby, 2000).  This creates resentment towards stakeholders who 
appropriate benefits without making equitable contributions.  Barred from capital growth, 
workers (sometimes led by managers) increase wage levels to extract surplus value so that 
private investments can be made elsewhere.  The organisation slowly bleeds to death as a 
result of chronic underinvestment (Vanek, 1977; Cornforth et al., 1988; Major, 1996, 1998; 
Ridley-Duff, 2002). 
A more robust model, it is argued, is one that uses both individual and collective ownership 
to entrench a variety of long-term interests that promote competition between short and 
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long-term priorities (Major, 1996, 1998).  This binds the fortunes of all stakeholders to the 
sustainability of the enterprise.  By doing this, thinking shifts towards ‘equilibrio’ between 
different interests to achieve balance between personal, collective and strategic goals 
(Oakeshott, 1990; Whyte and Whyte, 1991; Morrison, 1991; Watson, 1994). 
As for managerialist tendencies, management hegemony creates the social environment in 
which economic and social benefits are denied to some individuals and groups.  As Johnson 
(2006) points out, these problems are systemic: they reproduce themselves on a 
generational basis until hierarchical thinking is replaced by democratic controls (see Turnbull, 
1994, 1995; Ridley-Duff, 2005).  A key concern is how to avoid utilitarian thinking that 
legitimises the views of an elite (or majority) and unreasonably oppresses individuals and 
minority groups (see Willmott, 1993; Rawls, 1999; Parker, 2002; Gaus, 2003). 
In summary, therefore, the ‘not-for-profit’ characterisation of social enterprise obscures a 
complex set of philosophical and moral commitments regarding who can profit from its 
operation and how these profits can be used.  As a constitutional form, it legitimises 
collective rights/responsibilities that may lead to marginalisation of individual and minority 
group interests.  This attitude to individual rights, however, is not held across the entire social 
enterprise sector. 
More-than-Profit Views of Social Enterprise 
As Defourny (2001:23) acknowledges, “the NPO literature is not able to embrace the whole 
reality of the social enterprise”.  Firstly, ‘non-profit’ constraints do not apply to all 
organisations.  Worker, marketing and consumer co-operatives distribute profits to 
individuals and have developed democratic know-how that encourages equity in the 
allocation of social and economic benefits (Rothschild and Allen-Whitt, 1986; Whyte and 
Whyte, 1991; Cornforth, 1995; Turnbull, 1995). 
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A clear distinction between co-operative and private businesses, however, remains.  
Dividends are payable to those who make both a financial and a labour contribution.  In 
worker co-operatives dividends are payable to those who both work and invest in the 
enterprise.  In Spain, the concept of employment and wages has been eroded to the point 
where members receive monthly ‘anticipos’ (anticipated profits) that are adjusted at the end 
of each year (Ridley-Duff, 2005).  In marketing co-operatives, suppliers combine their 
product offerings to enhance their market profile.  Without committing their produce, 
however, no dividends are received.  In consumer co-operatives, benefits accrue only to 
those who buy their goods through the enterprise.  A person must walk the aisles to earn 
dividends.  In all cases, labour investments are expected from members in return for 
individualised benefits.  Conventional private companies do not require labour contributions 
before distributing surpluses to financial investors. 
The realisation that some social enterprises are not ideologically hostile to profit-making or 
sharing surpluses has prompted high-profile figures to talk of a ‘more than profit’ orientation.  
At the Social Enterprise Institute Conference in 20034, Liam Black  (then Social Entrepreneur 
of the Year) asked the audience in his keynote speech to repeat after him ‘profit is good’.  
This was echoed in the opening speech of Declan Jones (Director of the Social Enterprise 
Institute) and closing speech of Jonathan Bland (Director of the Social Enterprise Coalition) 
who both asked for a ‘more-than-profit’ mentality. 
This flexibility is reflected in the definition used by the Social Enterprise Coalition: 
A social enterprise is not defined by its legal status but by its nature: its social aims and 
outcomes; the basis on which its social mission is embedded in its structure and governance; 
and the way it uses the profits it generates through trading activities. 
(NEF / SAS5, 2004:8)  
Based on this definition, not only co-operative enterprises, but also majority 
employee-owned, and multi-stakeholder enterprises, can be included (Gates, 1998; Allen, 
2005; Brown, 2006; Ridley-Duff, 2006).  In these organisations, individual investment and 
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payouts are permitted.  External investors may also be allowed a ‘reasonable’ return on an 
equity investment.  Fair trade networks provide examples of supply chains based on trading 
relationships between worker, marketing and consumer co-operatives that deliver produce to 
supermarkets and retail outlets (see Jones, 2000; Allen, 2005).  Gates (1998:13) argues that 
this combination of investor, worker and consumer ownership can alter management 
practices: 
“Inside” ownership improves performance both directly (by encouraging insider challenges to 
poorly conceived management decisions) and indirectly – by influencing managers who know 
that the firm’s owners are now working amongst them.  Similarly, by including a component of 
consumer ownership, the utility’s managers (and their families) would live among 
shareholders who are also neighbors, schoolmates and teammates.  Such a 
community-focused ownership stake could change the quality of business relationships…. 
Gates stresses the role of individuals in shaping decisions.  In a way that echoes anarchist 
economics (see Veblen, 1898; Ward, 1966; Rothschild and Allen-Whitt, 1986), individual 
voluntary action is seen as a way to balance the excesses of formal collective power by 
preventing monopoly control over resources, information and debating forums. 
Problems with the ‘More than Profit’ View  
The view of social enterprise as a double (or triple) bottom line business places it in direct 
competition with the private sector.  As John Young of Hewlett-Packard states: 
Our basic principles have endured intact since our founders conceived them.  We distinguish 
between core values and practices; the core values don’t’ change, but the practices might.  
We’ve also remained clear that profit – as important as it is – is not why the Hewlett-Packard 
Company exists; it exists for more fundamental reasons. 
(Cited in Collins and Porras, 2000:46) 
Those ‘fundamental’ reasons are illustrated at Merck, discussed in a chapter about 
companies that are ‘built to last’.  A key reason, suggest the authors, is that all companies 
adopt a “more than profits” mentality (Collins and Porras, 2000:47).  Merck’s founder claims 
workers are “genuinely inspired by the ideals of advancement of medical science, and of 
service to humanity”.  Despite the popular pastime of attacking the profits of drug companies, 
Merck’s activities merit comparison to social enterprise activity: 
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…Merck elected to develop and give away Mectizan, a drug to cure “river blindness,” a 
disease that infected over a million people in the Third World with parasitic worms that 
swarmed through body tissue and eventually into the eyes, causing painful blindness.  A 
million customers is a good-sized market, except that these were customers who could not 
afford the product.  Knowing that the project would not produce a large return on investment – 
if it produced one at all – the company nonetheless went forward with the hope that some 
government agencies or other third parties would purchase and distribute the product once 
available.  No such luck, so Merck elected to give the drug away free to all who needed it...at 
its own expense.6 
When asked why it had done this, Merck executives pointed to the need to accommodate the 
views, and maintain the morale, of its scientists.   
Stories of “great” companies driven by social values rather than profits create problems for 
those on both sides of the Atlantic seeking to distinguish social from private enterprise on 
ethical grounds (Collins, 1997; Laville and Nyssens, 2001).  Rhetoric on social justice has a 
long tradition in liberal economics.  In Friedman (1962), the egalitarian nature of the market is 
promoted even as strict obedience to the primacy of shareholder value is required from 
senior managers (compare Sternberg, 1998).  Inside the company, however, strong divisions 
based on gender, ethnicity and class stand in contradiction to rhetoric about market 
democracy (see Kunda, 1992; Hennessy, 2003; Johnson, 2006).   
Nevertheless, mainstream businesses, and not just the social enterprise sector, can lay 
some claim to effective stakeholder involvement, commitment to diversity, and practices that 
address social exclusion as part of their strategy for economic and social success (Kotter & 
Heskett, 1992; Collins, 2001; Vinten, 2001; Wieland, 2005).  This overlap in values and 
social objectives, therefore, adds to the need for a theoretical framework that accommodates 
the grey areas between public, social and private enterprises. 
3. Methodology 
The findings that follow are the product of a critical ethnography (Thomas, 1993; Dey, 2002).  
Data was collected between December 2002 and March 2004 from three social enterprises 
that have survived more than 15 years.  For 7 months, I worked inside the primary case 
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company, Custom Products, for 20 hours per week.  During this period, I maintained a daily 
journal to capture events that took place and the reactions they provoked.  Additional data 
was collected from SoftContact Ltd, a cooperative trading for 22 years, and the Mondragon 
Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC), a group of 150 industrial and support cooperatives trading 
for over 45 years. 
To analyse data, I transcribed and then elaborated journal entries before subjecting findings 
to critical reflection in a number of different contexts.  I reviewed and typed up 
contemporaneous notes on board meetings, management meetings and staff training to 
assist theory development.  NVivo was used for text analysis.  Theoretical ideas were 
developed using a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Partington 2000, 
Locke, 2001).  Findings were authenticated in four ways: by comparing them against newly 
summarised journal data; by searching for inconsistencies and consistencies with data from 
(and literature on) Mondragon; by testing theoretical propositions with members of the 
primary case company; by testing theory in interviews with members of SoftContact Ltd. 
All methodologies have their limitations.  Ethnography’s strongest claim is that it can 
“penetrate the various complex forms of misinformation, fronts, evasions and lies’ that are 
considered endemic in most social settings” (Gill and Johnson, 2002:145).  Triangulation, of 
both methods and data, assisted in some contexts.  In the sphere of behavioural and 
linguistic meaning, however, all claims are open to challenge.  The critical ethnographer’s 
goal is to capture authentic plausible emancipatory perspectives on organisational life, not to 
prove hypotheses (Johnson et al, 2004). 
4.  Social Capital and Social Rationality 
The concept of ‘social capital’ was popularised by Coleman (1988).  Later, Putnam (1993, 
1995) applied the concept to the process of ‘civic engagement’ to realise Habermasian ideas 
about debate in public forums (Habermas, 1974).  Coleman and Putnam consider the private 
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and public aspects of social capital building.  In applying the concept to social enterprises, 
however, the public aspect is emphasised (Evers, 2001; Laville and Nyssens, 2001). 
Both draw attention to the issue of engagement across group boundaries and the ability to 
develop relationships between, and not just within, social groups.  Pearce (2003) highlights 
how social capital can be deployed by one social network against others and is not, of itself, 
necessarily used for the common good.  His rhetorical style, however, that shared values 
create solidarity between like-minded entrepreneurs is reminiscent of the unitarist outlooks of 
executive groups (compare Darwin et al, 2002; Johnson, 2006; Ridley-Duff, 2006).   
The claim that strong cultures based on ‘shared values’ produce superior organisation 
performance is questionable.  The emancipatory promise held out in the 1980s (Ouchi, 1981; 
Peters & Waterman, 1982; Kanter, 1983) has not been unequivocally validated by later 
research (Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Willmott, 1993; Thompson and Findlay, 1999).  
Moreover, analysis of the social enterprise sector does not reveal widespread commitment to 
shared values.  It is characterised by even more heterogeneity and diversity than is found in 
the private/public sectors (Wallace, 2005; Haugh, 2005; Allen, 2005). 
Mills and Clarke (1982) helpfully differentiate between exchange and communal 
relationships.  They argue that ‘exchange’ relationships are based on trading material 
benefits.  Communal relationships, on the other hand, are rooted not just in trading material 
benefits, but also trading information and emotions that bring about mutual commitment.  
Communal relationships have the capacity to survive disagreement and are characterised by 
higher levels of emotion and conflict combined with effective processes for making-up (see 
Aronson, 2003; Tjosvold et al, 2005).  If social capital is ‘fragile’, as suggested by Pearce 
(2003), this may indicate that social capital has not yet been established: the relationship is 
still at the ‘exchange’ rather than ‘communal’ stage of development. 
© Rory Ridley-Duff, 2006  Social Enterprise as a Socially Rational Business 
SERC 2006  11 Southbank University, London 
Below I explore the issue of ‘fragility’ by critically discussing data samples from Custom 
Products.  In particular, I show that rhetoric about ‘shared values’ may obscure, and even 
promote, low levels of social capital development. 
Empirical Data 
Attitudes to civic engagement can themselves be by-products of social relations in the private 
domain.  Ben7, a support services worker, reports on the way members of different work 
teams interact in both workplace and social settings:  
People are bonding inside the team.  I went and got a card and cakes for Hayley’s birthday 
and when I gave them to her she gave me a hug.  Then I told her I had not had a good 
weekend.  I was a bit cautious at first - I said all relationships have their problems - but then 
she opened up and told me about her mother having breast cancer and how this had affected 
her and her family over the last decade.  I found myself explaining in more detail what had 
happened at home.   
John was also there, and he opened up about the past. Harry and some other directors all 
have PE degrees (John, Harry and the other founder Reecey).  They have this common bond 
between them through an interest in athletics.  When I found out it was Larissa’s birthday, we 
had a drink, and I gave her a birthday kiss on the cheek.  These are little things.  People are 
letting each other into their life a bit.  This opening up is not just within our team.  We had a 
drink after the management class.  We were all chatting away and talking about Diane’s son 
and the great battle she has over his schooling.  I think she needed to get it off her chest.   
At Custom Products, semi-formal events were arranged to provide further opportunities to 
develop social capital.  One of these was called a “community development day”.  Mixed 
impacts are noted in a magazine article: 
Being part of this elicits the warmth of social acceptance.  And that is the point of the day.  
Most members of Custom Products are upbeat about the annual Development Day.  Despite 
its focus on fun, it has a serious purpose.  “People talk about it for months in advance and for 
months after,” explains Harry [Managing Director].  It’s true.  And after the trip, photos appear 
on the notice-board and stories are exchanged over the lunch table.  The day is based on the 
belief that having fun together is the best way to develop relationships that make a community 
thrive. 
Not everyone thrives, however.  Attendance is regarded as a community responsibility - 
repeated inexplicable absences may prompt the offer of a severance package.  Avoiding it can 
damage your career prospects – and some people have avoided them for years.  Staff who 
agree with the values are committed.  Others leave quietly with “culture mismatch” on their HR 
record.  Staff turnover is only just under the national average so stresses and strains exist. 
An analysis of staff turnover suggested it was twice (and perhaps at much as four times) as 
high as might reasonably be expected in a bona fide private sector company.  Sickness 
levels varied across the organisation, but in the primary production unit they were twice as 
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high as the average for the industry through 2003.  In 2004, this department was downsized: 
the majority of staff were redeployed to other departments.   
Management expectations of commitment to ‘community’ values is evident in arguments for 
flexible working on the basis that ‘this is the way we do things around here’.  As Harry’s notes 
for management classes reveal: 
Sometimes people come for interview and, because they really like a lot of what they see and 
hear in terms of the rights enjoyed by people… they withhold their real feelings about some of 
the responsibilities that people have to take on board.  For example, people may really like the 
idea of the right to a share of the community’s profits, but not the responsibility of full 
contribution to the community effort which may involve working some weekend days through 
the summer months. 
The impact of enforcing these ‘responsibilities’, however, affected people differently 
depending on non-work commitments.  Harry had more scope to see his wife (Valerie), 
regardless of weekend working arrangements, because she too worked within the company.  
The issue was more complex for others.  Chris, a warehouse worker, revealed that Judith: 
… discussed the reason she did not want a permanent job.  Going permanent would mean 
that she would have to work weekends and she was not prepared to do this while she had 
young children at home.  It was only when they reached their mid-teens that she had a change 
of heart.  She then applied for a permanent position, but was still turned down.  She was 
extremely down and within a few months had left for a new job. 
Ben experienced similar pressures.  Having taken a permanent position, expectations that he 
should work flexibly started to affect his life outside work:  
There is sick leave taken for emotional reasons.  If you are off for emotional reasons, they will 
do everything they can to support you.  On the face of it the workplace is excellent, but stress 
leads people to be off sick.  Work has been a factor in people going off.  I could not say it was 
the sole reason, or even the biggest factor, but relationship problems arise because of work.  
Sometimes you have to work additional hours week-in week-out because you dare not say 
‘no’.  You have to choose between work and relationships and that is detrimental to your 
whole life. 
For others, however, the workplace provided a sense of community and weekend working 
was accepted as a reasonable price for the ‘community culture’ on offer.  They actively 
participated in ‘socials’ (the name given to outings after work) and frequently made public 
expression of commitment.  On final reflection, however, these attitudes appeared to be 
more linked to a person’s advancement within the company and the quality of their personal 
relationships with work colleagues.  Those who developed close relationships inside the 
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company had fewer problems with ‘community’ expectations than those with strong 
commitments to family/friendship networks outside the workplace.  
A key finding is that social capital is built through discussion of individuals’ private, not public, 
lives.  Debate about political or business practice is no substitute for the exchange of 
personal stories that reveal individual vulnerability.  Moreover, the distinction between private 
and public is often blurred.  People talk about work at home, and home at work.  Many 
people engage more at work, and outside the home, because their personal lives are 
unsatisfying, or because family/friendship networks engage in civic activities to maintain their 
group relationships and identity.  Conversely, people withdraw from the workplace and civic 
engagement when social relations (i.e. courtship, family-raising or a sense of alienation) 
make it sensible to do so.  
Corporate expectations expressed through ‘community’ rhetoric, therefore, can create an 
illusion that social capital has developed.  The rhetoric itself can promote ‘fragility’ by 
highlighting cultural values that, if not readily embraced, will (ironically) result in new forms of 
social exclusion.  The finding that personal relationships are pivotal in the development of 
social capital raises the question of sexuality.  In the next section, this issue is considered in 
more detail. 
The Workplace as a Site of Sexuality 
The quality and desirability of personal relationships is paramount.  As Hearn and Parkin 
(1987:57) point out, sexual behaviour is “an ordinary and frequent public process rather than 
an extraordinary and predominately private process”.  Social capital, therefore, is not an 
abstract and organisationally focussed activity; it is a product of interpersonal dynamics 
through which we project and develop our social status and sexual identities.  Even when we 
are not seeking sexual contact at work, our activities are often oriented towards the 
maintenance of sexual relationships outside work, or the outcome of past sexual 
relationships (i.e. obligations towards children and former partners). 
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Our workplace activities, therefore, are not just directed towards the completion of tasks.  
They are framed by the pursuit of socio-sexual goals.  The way this occurs is illustrated 
below.  Ben’s relationship outside work broke down due partly to pressures at work.  Within 
weeks, however, he found that approaches by women created new opportunities for 
intimacy.  In the extracts below, he describes what happened after his work colleagues learnt 
of his difficulties:  
At lunch I talked with Hayley and opened up about what had happened - not massively - but 
enough to know what had happened at home.  She was very kind.  We amusingly talked 
about my need to get back into the dating game.  I said that I thought I would wait a bit before 
I do that.  I don’t think this is all in the head but I get the feeling there is a sexual connection 
between myself and Hayley - not that I am going to act on it.  She was telling me that I 
“wouldn’t be lonely” and that I would have “no trouble”.  I said that I got frustrated with the 
games men and women play, sometimes even when they don’t know it.  She looked at me 
knowingly and said “Oh yes, men and women know when they are playing games!”  I 
particularly remember her eyes as she said this - they became very narrow and quite piercing.   
It was light and it was nice.  I don’t mind. 
Hayley, possibly picking up on Ben’s wish “not to act” on the sexual chemistry between them, 
starts to adopts bolder strategies to get his attention:  
Hayley kept coming up and interrupting me from time to time.  I’m sure she didn’t need to, she 
just liked to.  She was wearing a lovely black top so I didn’t mind being interrupted by her at 
all.  We had lunch, and again I felt that there was a bit of sexual banter going on.  At one point 
she said “Ben, are you flirting with me?”  I said “Yes, just a bit”, then I said “I trust you’ll tell me 
to stop if you don’t like it”.  She came straight over and stood very close to me, then giggled in 
a girlish way.  She started asking my feelings about children, did I want children in the future?  
I also asked her.  In my head I’m asking myself “what is going on here?”  These are the kind of 
questions that you start to ask someone when you might have a romantic relationship. 
These findings are contextualised by an international study into sexual behaviour at work 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2004).  Firstly, the authors report that 60% of people form 
intimate relationships at work of which one-third are non-physical (compare Hearn and 
Parkin, 1987; Farrell, 1994)8.  Of these, four times as many people report long-term benefits 
than the reverse.  Productivity also rises due to the ‘exhilaration’ of working with someone 
you feel close to (even when intimacy is not expressed physically), while only 20% of people 
report any objection to such relationships. 
Courtship research sheds further light.  Molloy (2003) found that 40% of women choose their 
job to assist their search for a sexual partner9.  Women’s magazines provide frequent advice 
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on sexuality at work (even in those targeting ‘career-women’) and contemporary romance 
novels have switched to storylines based on workplace romance (Farrell, 1988, 1994, 
2000)10.  Men also use the workplace to find sexual partners (Hearn and Parkin, 1987, 2001; 
Buss, 1994; Collinson and Hearn, 2001), but the range and frequency of men’s sexual 
behaviour (relative to women) has frequently been exaggerated.  Radical feminists claims 
regarding levels of sexual harassment are contradicted by an increasing number of studies 
that find low rates of harassment and high rates of consensual sexual behaviour (see Gutek, 
1985; Farrell, 1994; Hoff-Sommers, 1995, 2000; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Buss, 2002; 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2004; Ridley-Duff, 2005).  From another perspective, 
evolutionary psychologists (more often men than women) ignore or misrepresent cultural 
explanations for patterns of sexual behaviour to support religious beliefs or Darwinian social 
theory (see Buss, 1994, 2002; Pinker, 2002). 
The majority of people in relationships report they are pursued for new relationships in their 
adult life (93% of men, 82% of women for ‘long-term mating’; 87% of men, 94% women for 
‘short-term mating’).  Overall, just under half (67% of men, 41% of women, for ‘long-term 
mating’; 40% of men, 31% of women for ‘short-term mating’) report that these attempts 
succeeded at least once (Buss, 2002). 
In the context of a debate about social capital, we are inevitably faced with a view that 
human behaviour is a product of (as well as a support system for) our sexual attitudes and 
choices.  Theorising about social capital without linking work processes to sexual identity, 
relationships and obligations, denies the extent to which organisations are complex centres 
of community-building where we satisfy a wide range of economic and social needs (see 
Watson, 1994).  As one conference delegate put it “perhaps this is the social enterprise that 
dare not speak its name?”11 
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Below, I accommodate these findings by developing a theory of social rationality.  Grounded 
theory is used to develop a new framework for understanding human behaviour.  I then relate 
this to practices and organizational forms observed in the social enterprise movement. 
Developing a Theory of Social Rationality 
The concept of social rationality, and the process by which it is exercised, emerged from 
close study of three enduring social enterprises.  At the highest level of abstraction, social 
rationality is the process by which people manage intimacy within personal relationships and 
social networks both inside and outside work.  It is the private/public process through which 
people exercise (and are denied) choices over how their relationships develop. 
Building on the socio-emotional work of Etzioni (1988), the theory examines how adherence 
to social norms (ethical behaviours and moral values) is driven by a desire to manage our 
relationships within a community.  Etzioni contended that some decisions require 
logical-empirical thinking (rationalism), but that these were also ‘infused’ with 
normative-affective (emotional) considerations. 
This is a significant department from classical economic models based on ‘rational man’ 
derived from the writings of Smith (1776) and Friedman (1962).  In traditional liberalism, the 
integrity of cognitive processes within each person is emphasised (see Gaus, 2003).  Group 
influences are denied, diminished, or regarded as a corrupting influence rather than a driving 
force.   The marginalisation of social thinking in economic theory finds expression in ‘utility 
value’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) ‘opportunistic behaviour’ (Williamson, 1975) and threats 
to efficiency and profitability (Donaldson, 2005). 
The weakness of both Etzioni’s model, and traditional economic models, is that they ignore 
(or do not make explicit) how sexual goals and obligations affect relationship and 
organization development.  Close analysis of empirical data reveals that human behaviour 
can be classified as either attention seeking/giving and/or assistance seeking/giving.   
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Hayley’s attention-seeking behaviour manifests itself as social (relationship oriented) even 
when there are hidden economic interests.   Similarly, Harry’s promotion of a “development 
day” encourages attention giving/getting as a support system for economic activity.  
Assistance seeking, on the other hand, manifests itself as economic (task oriented), but has 
measurable affects on individuals’ socio-sexual goals.  Ben felt he must assist the company 
as weekends, but this led to relationship breakdown outside the workplace.  Judith, on the 
other hand, refused to assist at weekends.  This protected her relationships outside work, but 
created problems inside work.  Harry resolved these dilemmas by having an affair and then 
marrying the woman who gave him the most assistance in developing his business.  By 
looking at Harry’s, Ben’s, Hayley’s and Judith’s choices as a recursive series of 
attention-seeking (and giving) and assistance-seeking (and giving) behaviours, it is possible 
to gain deeper insights into the way social capital develops. 
Grounded theory involves phases of open, axial and selective coding to drive iterative theory 
development (Locke, 2001).  The open coding phase involved micro-analysing samples of 
qualitative data taken from field journals, interviews, e-mails and other company documents.  
This produced a wide range of behaviours that were progressively organised through private 
reflection, discussion with research participants, presentations at academic conferences, 
research study groups and seminars, until the second phase (axial) and third phase 
(selective) coding was completed.  The core concept to emerge from this process is intimacy 
management. 
Table 1 shows a sample of behaviours.  The data was analysed until “saturated” to establish 
the rigour of the framework and provides a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, list of 
behavioural strategies to get and give attention and assistance.  Behaviours with an asterisk 
(*) are most likely - on the basis of the data samples analysed - to be “sent” with the intention 
of increasing opportunities for intimacy.  They are also more likely to be interpreted as a 
desire for a more intimate (or sexual) relationship, even if this was not the intention. 
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Table 1 – Giving and Getting Assistance/Attention (Behaviour Analysis) 
Assistance Physical Meeting, Organising, Making, Avoiding 
 Intellectual Organising, Theorising, Interviewing, Teaching, Evaluating, Noticing, 
Checking 
 Material Paying, Awarding, Feeding 
Attention Access (Preventing) Ignoring, Withholding*, Frightening, Forgetting, 
Withdrawing, Barring, Resisting*  
  
Body Language: Touching*, Looking*, 
Smiling*, Waving, Turning*, Flirting*, 









can be regarded 
as attempts to 
deny access and 
exclude 
individuals) 
Behaviours: Meeting*, Reading, Offering, 
Trading, Attracting*, Employing, Inviting*, 
Consenting, Agreeing, Arranging, Sending*, 
Acknowledging, Awarding, Attending, Playing*, 
Questioning, Encouraging*, Giving*, Listening, 
Helping*, Impressing*, Supporting, Committing 
  Verbal 
 
Phoning, Storytelling*, Complimenting*, 
Writing, Apologising, Talking, Asking, 
Describing, Bantering*, Informing, Texting*, 
Arguing* 
 Sharing Confessions*, Contacts, Plans*, Reflections, 
Suggestions, Resources, Time, Space, 
Interests 
 
Information Acquiring Enquiring, Exchanging, Telling, Finding, 
Discovering 
  Using Understanding, Speculating, Organising 
 Emotion N/A Intending, Caring*, Fearing*, Wanting*, 
Aspiring, Coveting*, Appreciating, Liking*, 
Enjoying*, Jealousing*, Worrying. 
These behaviours occur when relationships are being developed.  Not engaging in them has 
the reverse effect by reducing or destroying social capital.  Individuals may also temporarily 
withdraw until they have more information or until they have deliberated with others about 
how to view a person.  After information has been acquired and evaluated, it may be used to 
re-approach the other person and increase intimacy through inclusive behaviours. 
In the early stages of a relationship, the primary focus is gaining (or giving) access to 
information.  As the relationship develops, parties start to tell each other stories.  Initially 
these reveal biographical information and future (public) aspirations.  As time passes, 
however, stories reveal more personal information and private aspirations.  Finally, 
particularly if both parties consent, emotions start to be affected and intimacy deepens.  A 
© Rory Ridley-Duff, 2006  Social Enterprise as a Socially Rational Business 
SERC 2006  19 Southbank University, London 
relationship can, however, break down at any stage of development, in which case both 
parties distance themselves from each other both physically and emotionally. 
The workplace provides bricks to start building a relationship (by instituting formal 
relationships) but the cement that binds it is regular and frequent exchange of personal 
information, sexual banter and shared reflection about relationships inside and outside the 
workplace.  By examining the process as it unfolds over time, the following high-level 
descriptions were developed (Table 2). 
Table 2 – Assistance and Attention Giving/Getting 
Class Sub-Class Non-Sexual Sexual 
Assistance 
 
Physical Giving and getting commitments to 
meet face-to-face, travel and 
relocation to facilitate meetings, and 
direct assistance with tasks that 
involve physical effort. 
Sexual acts that fuel commitments 
and obligations to care for (and 
economically support) sexual 
partners and/or children. 
 Intellectual 
 
Giving and getting conceptual ideas 
that facilitate other tasks, or provide 
alternative ways of understanding. 
Knowledge of giving/getting sexual 
pleasure that induces and maintains 
mutual commitment. 
 Material Giving and getting material support 
(money, resources). 





Access Giving and getting access to people, 
intellectual ideas, resources etc. 
Giving and getting touches and 
looks that are sexually stimulating.  
Displaying body parts that others 
find sexually stimulating (butts, 
cleavages, legs etc.) 
 Information Giving and getting information about 
people, ideas and tasks so that 
access can be facilitated or 
assistance offered. 
Giving and getting sexual stories, 
knowledge and jokes. 
 Emotion Giving and getting access/information 
or assistance that facilitates emotional 
expression, discussion and 
understanding. 
Giving and getting access or 
information that stimulates or 
communicates sexual feelings. 
Thinking processes, therefore, can be viewed as a concurrent application of: 
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• Economic Rationality  
Getting/Giving Physical, Intellectual and Material Assistance 
• Social Rationality  
Getting/Giving Access, Information and Emotional Attention 
Make or break moments occur when parties clarify their feelings for each other.  Parties 
unable to communicate at an emotional level become stuck in a perpetual series of 
‘exchange’ relationships (often superficial and short-lived).  They struggle to develop the 
intimacy that leads to ‘communal’ relationships (see Mills and Clark, 1982).  Economic 
rationality (giving physical, intellectual and material assistance) builds economic capital.  
Social rationality (giving access, information and emotional attention) builds social capital.   
Communal relationships are those that accommodate the levels of emotion and 
communication necessary to survive repeated disagreement (Mills and Clark, 1982).  The 
inability to develop them, therefore, acts as a barrier to the distribution of social and 
economic capital.  In exchange relationships (based only on trading material benefits) 
perceived rejection and criticism is much more likely to trigger immediate withdrawal.  
As emotional bonds are weak, when economic benefits are not longer perceived, one or both 
parties withdraw.  Where emotional bonds are stronger, the relationship may mutate until 
characterised by mistrust and aggression, with the goal of separation or punishment for 
emotional hurt.  Alternatively, it may evolve into an even more intimate relationship as a 
result of dialogue triggered by the disagreement (see Ridley-Duff, 2005, Chapter 5).   
Figure 1 summarises how economic and social capital develops. 
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In the next section, I develop the ideas above to construct a new view of social enterprise as 
a socially rational business. 
5. Discussion 
The theoretical model in Figure 1 clarifies several things.  Firstly, the mutuality believed to 
underpin social capital is fragile if personal bonds have not been cemented by reciprocal 
emotional exchanges (compare Pearce, 2003).  Measuring inter-trading activities, therefore, 
is not necessarily a good indicator of social capital (although it can be one possible 
outcome).  The longevity of trading relationships, and the ability to survive disagreement, is a 
better indicator of the level of social capital. 
Secondly, the model clarifies the recursive nature of economic and social behaviour.  Any 
behaviour, when reciprocated, represents a thread that joins two people and potentially 
increases/decreases intimacy.  Two parties giving and getting on all threads will be “in love” 
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but this is rare.  Most relationships develop slowly over time and are carefully constructed 
subsets of threads, formed or broken as a result of changing dependencies and restricted 
opportunities for intimacy.   
Groups of threads can be viewed as “bonds” that strengthen a relationship.  Changing 
patterns of interaction and thread building/breaking account for changes in behaviour, 
personality, motivation and performance.  This perspective has explanatory value when 
considering how behaviours change over time, and is more dynamic than genetic or social 
inheritance explanations.  It accounts for rapid changes in behaviour that arise from changed 
intentions and opportunities at both inter-personal and inter-group levels (compare Blumer, 
1969). 
Behaviours that lead to intimacy may be adopted for their own sake.  Alternatively, they may 
be adopted for instrumental reasons or because one party is obliged to fulfil contractual 
obligations.  Behaviours that are adopted through obligation may become voluntary as 
intimacy increases.  Also, the receiving party cannot always tell whether the behaviour has 
been adopted for its own sake (purely social), or instrumental (oriented towards an economic 
goal) leading to considerable ambiguity and potential for misunderstanding (compare 
Griseri, 1998).   
Behaviour intended to build (or break) a relationship is social rationality.  A person may 
undertake a task (or adopt behaviours) not because it is economically rational to do so, but 
because it is socially rational to effect changes.  The relationship may be an end in itself 
(social) or a means to an end (economic).  The outcome of socially rational behaviour is a 
change in the level of social capital.  Behaviour intended to fulfil (or frustrate) a task is 
economic rationality, and the outcome is a change in the level of economic capital.  
Economic goals may impact positively, negatively or not at all, on social capital. 
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Implications 
This view of economic activity suggests new ways to measure economic health.  Instead of 
measuring profitability or market value, the changing frequency and quality of physical, 
intellectual and material assistance reflects the underlying level of health in an economy.  
Economic capital is built by developing our capacity to give/receive intellectual, material and 
physical assistance.  Social capital is built by increasing our capacity to access information 
that leads to emotional engagement.  Accumulations of either social or economic capital (in 
exclusive social networks or financial reserves, for example) can be taken as indicators of 
social ill-health, a state of inequality and potential social division.  In place of a private 
enterprise economy premised on the goal of financial capital accumulation, social enterprise 
economics is premised on equitable distribution of social and economic capital.   
Governance and managerial practices, therefore, move towards surplus sharing and 
“equilibrio” (balance) rather than profit maximisation and capital accumulation.  Economically, 
this might be measured through the number of investors, employees, customers and 
suppliers (divided into the collective value of their transactions).  Economic health can also 
be measured by monitoring the distribution of surpluses across stakeholder groups, rather 
than levels of accumulation.  Social health measures could include: monitoring the scope and 
quality of stakeholder involvement in corporate governance; changes in company 
membership; the durability and quality of relationships within family, business and friendship 
networks; the frequency and durability of consensual intimacy and sexual relationships. 
Table 3 shows a conceptual framework developed from this analysis.  Instead of viewing 
‘social enterprise’ as a subset of the social economy, it can be viewed as a set of business 
practices that distributes economic and social capital equitably across stakeholder 
groups to satisfy both individual and collective needs. 
 Table 3 – Framework for Assessing Socialisation of an Enterprise  
 
 
   
Private Enterprise         Social Enterprise 
E Q U I L I B R I O 
  Stakeholders Investors Managerial Labour 
(Directors / Executives) 
Productive Labour 
(Supervisors / Workers) 
Customers &  
Beneficiaries 
Suppliers 
Individual  Surplus sharing 
(dividends) and access 




surplus sharing and 
access to a fair share of 
the capital created. 
Wages/Income (above 
subsistence levels), 
surplus sharing and 
access to a fair share of 
the capital created. 
Product/service choice 
and influence over 
design, delivery and 
pricing of goods and 
services. 
Fair contracts: win-win 














over resources and use 
of assets. 
Collective funds for 





and delivery.  
Surpluses used to 
lower prices. 
Fair contracts: win-win 
financial outcomes, 
social premiums or 




Increasing levels of intimacy amongst individuals within stakeholder groups. 
Sufficient intimacy across group boundaries (through individual relationships) to promote mutual understanding and tolerance. 
























Collective Acknowledgement and representation in corporate governance. 
Intra and inter-group structures for debate, social contact and conflict resolution. 
A positive attitude to consensual sexual behaviour across group boundaries. 
 6.  Conclusions 
A socially rational business develops processes to build and distribute social and economic 
capital.  If it is doing this, we can reasonably expect governance structures, business 
processes, and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to reflect this.  It may also plan its 
operations so that its surpluses are reinvested and/or distributed on a continual basis.  Its 
constitutional arrangements (or informal practices) will show reciprocal relationships that 
allow each stakeholder group to monitor KPIs relevant to their own social interests and 
debate these with other stakeholder groups. 
Stakeholder control is less developed in the UK than other European countries.  European 
examples integrating stakeholder perspectives into corporate governance (Turnbull, 1995; 
Vinten, 2001; Wieland, 2005) have not yet shifted thinking in the UK away from the primacy 
of investor control and “enlightened shareholder value” (Friedman, 1962; Sternberg, 1998; 
DTI, 2005).  Nevertheless, the number of authors arguing for risk-sharing/surplus-sharing 
models continues to grow.  At the heart of alternative arguments is a position grounded in 
empirical research that organisation structures promoting ‘equilibrio’ (balance) between 
individual and collective interests across a range of stakeholder groups will yield better social 
and economic results (Ellerman, 1990; Major, 1996, 1998; Major and Body, 2000; Conyon 
and Freeman, 2001; Collins, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2002, 2005, 2006; Allen, 2005; Brown, 2006; 
Johnson, 2006). 
Multi-stakeholder perspectives also assume that managers are just one ‘pack’ amongst 
many, and that all stakeholder groups experience their own perceptual limitations due to 
bounded rationality (Simons and Hawkins, 1949).  Governance objectives change.  Rather 
than focussing on developing the skills of a unitary board, ‘best practice’ becomes the 
establishment of devolved centres of power integrated through carefully crafted governance 
systems to bring out conflicts of interest and resolve them through debate. 
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Programmes for management change can be developed by identifying practices that have 
frustrated the goal of “equilibrio” (balance).  Instead of establishing criteria against which an 
enterprise may qualify as ‘social’, the framework provides an opportunity for practitioners to 
reflect on the domains in which practices are and are not driven by social rationality. 
Applying and Using the Framework 
From a policy perspective, applying the framework can yield insights into the activities and 
impacts of an enterprise.  The model encourages reflection on the equity of social control 
mechanisms (distribution of social capital) and access to various assets (distribution of 
economic capital).  Profitability and task-completion is seen as a means to an end, but not an 
end in itself.  The end sought is an increase in the capacity to give/get physical, intellectual 
and material assistance (economic capital), and increasing levels of access to information so 
that emotional exchanges take place (social capital). 
Althusser once remarked that social theory needs to develop an understanding of both 
‘production’ and ‘reproduction’ (see Barrett, 1991).  In supporting this view, I nevertheless 
reach a different conclusion to Etzioni (1988).  Economic or logical thinking is no more 
‘rational’ than normative-affective thinking.  Social rationality is recursively linked to economic 
rationality, and both are in evidence when the stories behind decisions are deconstructed.  
In future research, cognitive and social psychologists might wish to explore the extent to 
which mutual and reciprocal behaviours (within and across social groups) can be quickly 
captured and measured.  These can be correlated with other measures of organization 
performance to see whether intimacy – increasingly equitable and reciprocal attention and 
assistance - is consistently correlated with other measures of organisation performance.  
Tjosvold’s study provides a model for this.  Co-operative conflict resolution was found to 
produce greater trust and confidence that, in turn, predicted perceptions and other measures 
of group performance (Tjosvold et al, 2005). 
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Lastly, researchers can deploy the framework to guide investigations into how enterprises 
distribute (or do not distribute) economic and social capital.  It provides categories for 
analysis and reporting of findings in a way that is meaningful and relevant to social enterprise 
practitioners.  This article, therefore, is a new social construction for understanding and 
researching social enterprise.   Its usefulness and limitations lie in the way it represents the 
practices of those it seeks to study, and can be critiqued on this basis. 
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